priate conditions [Goswami, 1991] . However, analogical reasoning can lead to errors. One cause is using the wrong analog; another is that tbe mapping task can be complex, result ing in high processing loads. Some character istic performance patterns, and certajn age effects, can be explained io this way.
J develop my argument by considering three cognitive processes, wbose implications for cognitive development have not yet been explored. These are analogies [Gentner, 1983: Holyoak and Thagard. 1989] , pragmatic rea soning schemas [Cheng and Holyoak, 1985� Cheng et al., 1986] , and mental models [Jobo soo-Laird, 1983� Gentner and Stevens. 1983 ).
I wisb to examine the potential of these con tructs to account for children's cognitive per formance. I will link them to a metric for con ceptual complexity based on the rumensional ity of concepts. The processes entailed in two developmentally significant inference tasks, transitivity and class inclusion, will be exam ined to show how the theory can shed light on some long-standing problems in the cognitive development Jjterature.
Inference Processes

Analogies
An analogy is defined by as a mapping from a base lo a target. In the sim ple proportional analogy 'human is to baby as horse is to foal', 'human is to baby' is the base, and 'horse is to foal' 'is the target. Elements in the base are mapped into the target (all map pings are bidirectional or 'bijective' unless indicated otherwise, so it does not matter whether they are described from base to target or the reverse). 'Human' is mapped into 'horse', and 'baby' into 'foal'; the relation 'parent of' in the base then corresponds to the same relation in the target. Corresponding relations in base and target need not be identi-
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Halford cal, however, as examples to be considered later will show. Gentner [ 1983] shows that not all attributes of base and target elements are mapped; e.g., the buman attribute 'walks on two legs' is not mapped to horse. Relations are mapped selectively, those relations that enter into a coherent strncture being more likely to be mapped (the principle of'systematicity').
lt has been shown that children can use analogies in problem solving [Alexander et al., 1989; Brown et al., l 986; Crisafi and Brown, l 986; Gholson et al.. 1988; l 984]. Furthermore, even young children have no difficulties with simple analogies if the relations used are ones they readily under stand [Brown, 1989: Goswami, l 991]. Analo gies have also been shown lo be important in understanding concepts [Gentner and Gent ner. 1983] , problem solving [Gick and Ho lyoak, 1983] , perspective-taking [Yaniv and ShaLZ, I 990] , and transfer of learning [Brown, 1989; Holyoak et al., l 984] . The role of analo gies in cognition in general has been explored by Holyoak [1982] .
An advantage of analogical reasoning con ceptions of human inference is that work on process models of analogy is well advanced. A number of simulation models provide objec tive theories of human analogical inference.
Among them are the Analogical Constraint
Mapping Engine (ACME) [Holyoak and Tha� gard, 1989) , the Strncture Mapping Engine (SME) [Falkenbainer et al., 1989] , COPY CAT [Mitchell and Hofstadter, 1990] , and the Structured Tensor Analogical Reasoning model (ST AR) [Halford et al., in press ]. The STAR model builds on mathematical work on levels of structure mapping by Halford and Wilson [1980] and on an earlier simulation model by Bakker and Halford [ 1988) . There is a high degree of consensus among these mod els about basic processes, and in many re spects they only represent different levels of description [Palmer, J 989] . The models all contain algorithms that establish that base and targets are io structural correspondence.
Work by Halford and Wilson [1980] ect to the way information is coded [Gick and Holyoak, 1983] . However, analogies go beyond the in formation retrieved, because the interaction of base and target forms a new structure that extends beyond previous experience.
Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas
A pragmatic reasoning schema [Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; Cheng et aJ., 1986 ] is an abstract knowledge structure induced from ordinary Life experience. Like those involving analogies, theories based on pragmatic rea soning schemas share common ground with knowledge-based theories. An example is the permission schema. H is abstract in the sense that it applies in numerous domains, yet it is learned through Hfe experience. Cheng and Holyoak [ 1985] have shown that the four-card problem [Wason, 1966] can be performed us ing the permission schema. The standard symbolic version of tbe four-card problem consists of four cards, each with a letter on one side and a digit on the other. The four vis ible faces of the cards contain tbe symbols A, B, 4, and 7, and the subject is given tbe rule 'If there is a vowel on one side, there is an even number on the other side'. The task is 10 spe cify which cards must be turned over to test the rule. The correct answer (A and 7) is rarely given by children or adults, the most common choices being A and 4 [Evans. 1982 : Light et al., 1989 O' Brien and Overton, 1982] . Cheng and Holyoak [ 1985] contend that people perform this task not by invoking for mal rules of conditional logic but by applying a pragmatic reasoning schema. They showed that inducing participants to use the permis sion schema (in order to have a vowel on one side. there must be an even number on the other side) improved performance, whereas training in logic did not [Cheng et al., l 986] .
Tbe effect is not dependent on using a con crete version of the task. The same effect was found with an abstract permission task: 'Jf one is to take actiou A, one must satisfy pre condition P' [Cheng and Holyoak, 1985 . Ex
The permission schema is isomorphic to implication in formal conditional logic, as Once the mapping has been made, base and target become fused, resulting in a single 
Mental Models
Mental models used in problem solving [Johnson-Laird, 1983; Gentner and Stevens, 1983] are mental constructions that represent the problem data and provide a workspace for reasoning processes. Two major sources of mental models are learning and analogy. To solve a familiar problem, it is often possible to retrieve a previously learned mental model from memory. Mental models can also be expressed as collections of rules [Holland et al., 1986 [Holland et al., , 1989 . To the extent that the prob lem resembles situations for which we have previously learned rules, those rules can be applied directly. Tb is process is relatively effi cient and effortless, and most of our problem solving probably occurs this way. Where there is no appropriate mental model for the situa tion, a structurally similar model from another situation can be used by analogy. A mental representation of the new problem can be mapped into the mental model for another situation. This mapping allows for much greater flex. ibility ju problem solving, but it may impose a higher processing load, for rea sons that I make clear shortly.
In tasks presented as logical reasoning problems, the answer cannot be found by search ing memory. because the task is nor mally constructed so that semantic informa tion is either irrelevant or insufficient to pro vide the answer. ln the four-card problem, the validity of the proposition 'if there is a vowel on one side, there is an even number on the other' cannot be assessed by retrieving infor mation from memory. The task has been structured so that any semantic knowledge we might have about vowels and numbers is use less. The same is true of most logical reason ing tasks given to children. For example. in transitive inference tasks (a> b. b > c. there fore a> c), the relation between a and c is not normally known prior to the experiment, but must be deduced from the premises. Tradi tional Piagetian testing procedures go funher and contain extralogical (perceptual. seman tic, and syntactic) cues biased against the cor rect answer. For example, in class inclusion tests, the linguistic form of the question 'more fruit or more apples?' tends to invite subclass comparison [Shipley, 1979) . wbich conflicts with the logical inference that there are more elements in the superordinate class than the subclass. People do not appear to possess knowledge that is specifically eqLtivalent to logical rules. I do not want to oversimplify an issue that 1 have discussed more extensively elsewhere [Halford. 1982 [Halford. , 1989 ], but for the present pur pose it is suffi cient to say that some very sophisticated approaches to psycho-logic [Braioe. 1978; Falmagne, 1975; Henle, l 962; Luria, 1976 : Osherson, I 974a, b, 1975 ; Shaklee, 1 9791 have not so far es ta bl ished that natural reasoning is based on logical, or uni versally valid rules. It seems more plausible to suggest that it is based on relatively content specific information stored in memory [Tversky and Kahneman, 1973] .
Since inferences require more than retrie val of information from memory. bul are likely to be based on content knowledge of some kind, processes must be found that meet these requirements. Inferences can be made by mapping the problem into a known schema, such as Cheng and Holyoak's [I 985 ] permis sion schema. Such pragmatic schemas have an intenuediate degree of generality, and are in duced from life experience. They are content specific in the sense that they encode particu lar situations. s\Jch as permission, but are gen eral enough to mediate inferences that go beyond previous experience. Inferences can also be made by representing the problem as a mental model of the kind discussed by John son-Laird [ 1983] . Tn the present context, the main difference seems to be that pragmatic reasoning schemas can normally be retrieved intact from semantic memory, while mental models must be constmcted. However. as with analogies, there must be a structuraJ con-e spondence between tbe mental model and the problem presented.
Learnjng mechanisms by which mental models can be acquired have been defined by Holland et al. [I 986] . In their theory a mental model is characterized as a rule, or set of rules. that predicts some aspect of the environment. Those rules lhat predict successfully are strengthened, and those that make uncon firmed predictions are weakened. Other prin ciples are (a) rules making redundant predic tions are not strengthened: (b) where more than one rule matches a situation. Lhe predic tions from the most specific rules are ac cepted, and (c) rules can be activated in paral lel. and can be mutually supportive or inhibi tory. thereby providing for coherence. Ac cording to Holland et al. [1986] . rules can serve as mental models and can represent contingencies in the environment.
Representations are mappings from a cog nitive structure to a segment of the environ ment [Halford, 1982; Halford and Wilson. 1980; Holland et al.. 1986� Palmer. 1978 . The environment may refer to some structure in the external real world (e.g., a social or physicaJ system), or to the structure of a problem that has been presented (e.g., premises of an inference task). Representa tions and anaJ ogies are both mappings from one structure to another, but in the former case the mapping is from mental to environ mental structures, and in the latter case it is from one mental structure to another [Hol land et al., 1986] . One consequence is that mental models are more dependent on experi ence with the environment and on learning mechanisms. By contrast, analogies depend primarily on recognition of correspondence between one mental structure and another. This recognition is a different mechanism from learning, and so tasks that depend on anaJogies will have different characteristics from tasks that depend on mental models based on learned rules.
ln order for mental models based on learn ing to correspond to tile environment, they require feedback to establish their validity.
According to Holland et al. [1986] , recall, rules that successf uJly predict the environ ment are strengthened, while those that do not are weakened. Feedback is central to this learning mechanism. Feedback from the envi ronment is not required, in contrast, for anal ogy. With the human:baby::horse:foal analogy mentioned earlier, we do not need feedback to know that base and target structures corre spond. Tills corresondence can be recognized from the structures themselves.
Mental Models and Task Di j
]iculties To summarize the argument so far, I have contended that much of human reasoning is essentially analogical and depends on map ping a problem into a structurally similar mental model or schema. Tbis type of infer ence draws on knowledge gained through ex perience but uses it to go beyond experience.
Given evidence that even young children rea-
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Balford dily make analogical inferences with content that is suitable for them, the model seems applicable to children's reasoning.
I will now consider how two developmen tally significant inference tasks, transitivity and class inclusion, are perfonned, and show that U1e reasoning processes they entail are consistent with this model. I then show that transitivity and class inclusion have tbe same level of structural complexity, creating a pro cessing load that accounts for some of the dif ficulties that children and adults have with these Lasks. This argument will then be gener alized by defining levels of structural com plexity in more abstract terms. Finally, I show how the model leads lo a reinterpretation of the concepts of structure and stage in theories of cognitive development.
Inference Tasks
One reason for choosing transitive infer ence and class inclusion is that both concepts cause errors for young children. Explaining these errors has been a challeoge to existing theories. Another reason is that these tasks have been subject to intensive investigation, with the result thaL there is a large, high-qual ity data base relevant to each. The basic solu tion process is well known for tr:ansifr,iity. For class inclusion, although there is a lot of litera ture to constrain a theory, the solution process remains unclear. Hence, the theory can be developed with respect to transitivity, then applied to predicting the process involved in class inclusion.
Transitive Inference
Transitive inference (a > b. b > c, there fore a > c) is a special case of N-term series problems, in which a number of relational premises are presented and an inference about the order of the terms is required. Sev-eral reviews of transitive inference exist [Bres low. 1981; Halford, 1982 : Maybery. 1987 Sternberg, 1980; Thayer and Collyer, 1978; Trabasso, 1977) . I wilJ briet1y summa rize the most common explanations for er rors.
According to Piaget [ 1950] , the f ail ure of children under 7-8 years of age is due to their not having reached the concrete operational stage of cogoi rive development. However. the stage concept is subject to a number of well known difficulties, one of which is that it is essentially descriptive and does not define the underlying mechanisms. Bryant and Trabasso [ L 971] proposed that young children fail transitivity not because they fail to under stand the principle, but because they forgot the premises. They therefore trained children to recall the premises and also modified the task to obviate certain other sources of false positives and false negatives. They found that 3-to 4-year-olds made transitive inferences at a level significantly above chance. However. subsequent work by Riley and Trabasso [ 197 4] showed that the task was performed by arranging the premise elements in order dur ing the training phase. This fact in itseU' does not invalidate the results, but the problem is that children who did not learn the premises were eliminated. They might have failed to learn because they could not arrange the premise elements in order, but since doing so entails transitivity. it is possible that children were eliminated because lbey did not under stand transitivity [Halford. 1989] . Further more, the premises were presented in ascend ing or descending order to facilitate acquisi tion, a condition that provides undtte help in ordering. When this feature was eliminated, children under 5 failed the task [Kallio, 1982� Halford and Kelly, 1984] .
More recent evidence, however, suggests that 4-year-olds can make transitive infer ences under certain conditions. Pears and Bryant [ 1990] presented premises in tbe form of pairs of coloured blocks one above the oth er, e.g., block A above B. block B above C, C above D and D above E. Children were required to build a tower with another set of blocks of the same colour as the premise blocks, with a top-down order A, B. C, D, E, consistent wit11 the premises. Before building the tower, they were asked inferential ques tions. sucb as whether blockB would be above or below block D. Trus proced ure elegantly tests ability to make transitive inferences based on spatial posiLion (e.g .. B above C, C above D, therefore B above 0), and 4-year olds performed significantly above chance in two experiments. Pears and Bryant acknowl edge that the task might be performed by manipulating images of the premises. For ex ample, given that B is above C and C above D in the pairs of blocks that are currently visible, it is possible to imagine pair B-C sitting on top of pair C-D. and It would then be apparent that in a tower, B would be above D. Pears and Bryant claim however, and I would agree, that this is a legitimate way to make a transi tive inference.
We still have the problem, however, of explaining why children find other transitive inference tasks difficult. ln this respect it is instructive to compare Pears and Bryant's [ 1990] procedure with that of Halford [I 984 ]. Both used colour-coded premises, both ob viated the need for retention of premises in memory, and both used tasks appropriate for young children. However. my task had prem ises coded in the form of coloured pegs in a board. Children were asked to arrange tubes whose colours matched those of the pegs (and which also contained sticks of different lengths) in an order consistent with the pairs of pegs on the board. Pears and Bryant suggest that children in my study may have experi enced difficulties because it was hard for them to translate spatial position into length. This cannot be true in its entirety. because my data show that even 3-year-olds could order the tubes without error, consistent wilh the peg board, provided the ordering task was con structed so they could process the premises serially. Therefore, they were undoubtedly able to translate the pegboard infonnation into the task of ordering the tubes. What they could nol do is make this translation by pro cessing two premises jointly. When they had to order tubes using information from two premises in a single decision. 3-to 4-year-olds fa iled. Therefore, the comparison of my study with that of Pears and Bryant shows that 3-to 4-year-olds have trouble mapping from one representation to another ll'hen This mapping depends on two premises (which, collectively, express two relations). Furthermore, their failure on this task is consistent with difficul ties encountered in numerous other tasks. as we shall see.
My objective is to explain the residual dif fi culty in transitivity inference that has not been explained by previous theories. As noted earlier. difficuJties are more likely to be diag nosed and overcome if we have a valid ac count of tbe underlying mechanisms. I there fore want to consider whether an account based on analogical reasoning and pragmatic reasoning schemas can shed light on these dif ficulties.
JI 11a!ogica! Reasoning and Transitive Inference Tbere is abundant evidence that transitive inference is frequently performed by arrang ing the premise elements into an ordered set [Riley and Trabasso. 1974; Thayer and Col lyer, 1978 : Halford, 1982 : Sternberg, 1980 . Participants characteristically men tally arrange tile premise clements in order from left-to-right or top-to-bottom.
The concept of arranging things in left right or top-bottom fashion conforms to 200 Holford Cheng and Holyoak's [ 1985] definition of a pragmatic reasoning schema as an abstract knowledge structure induced from ordinary life experience. Therefore. the process of ar ranging premise elements from left-lo-right or top-to-bottom amounts Lo mapping them into a pragmatic reasoning schema. It entails tak ing a previously learned schema, the left-right or Lop-bottom order. and using it to perform a task that is structurally isomorphic to it. Figure I shows the mapping entailed in performing a transitive inference task with the premises 'Peter is fairer than Tom' and 'John is fairer than Peter'. The mapping is a case of analogical reasoning as defined by . The left-right. or top-bottom. schema serves as the base. and the premises are the target. The analogy is constructed by mapping John into top position. Peter into middle position, and Tom into bottom posi tion. as shown in figure I . Having mapped the premises into the top-down schema. the schema itself can be ignored, and only the string of premise elements and the relation (in this case, 'fairer than') need be retained. The string can then be inspected to see that John is fairer than Tom.
One source of difficulty is the fact that the mapping of the problem into the schema en tails a processing load. The load occurs be cause we must process both premises jointly 10 perform the mapping. To take the earlier example, the premise 'Peter is fairer than Tom' only tells us that Peter is in top or mid dle position. Only by processing the second premise 'John is fairer than Peter' can we determine tJ1at Peter is in middle position. In general, mapping premise elements into ordi nal positions in transitive inferences entails considering two premises jointly, and the re sulting processing load has been empirically con.finned [Maybery et al., 1986) . We have also shown that mapping the two premises into an integrated representation imposes a processing load that causes difficulty for young children [Halford et al.. l 986] . Both studies provide a considerable amotmt of data showing that the premise integration process does entail a high load. Thus. the process of mapping premises into a schema to produce an integrated representation imposes a high processing load for both children and adults. Therefore, it is not that children perform the task dif f erently than adults. Both perform the task in essentially the same way. and the resulting processing load affects both. How ever. children are more sensitive to the load than adults are.
The task used by Pears and Bryant [ 1989] may have been easier because it did not require mapping from one representation to another. Recall that it is possible to perform their task by manipulating an image of the stimuli, i.e., by imaging one pair of bricks on top of the other pair. OnJy oue mental repre sentation, the image of the visible stimuli. is required, and it is not necessary to map from one mental representation to another. as oc curs in analogy. Given our hypothesis that the mapping from one mental representation lo another imposes the processing load responsible for the major difficulties young children have with transitive inference, the Pears and Bryant task should be easier.
To summarise the argument with respect lo transitivity, it is proposed that the welJ established procedure of arranging premise elements in order entails using a generalised. previously learned ordering schema, usually either left-to-right or top-to-bottom. The premise elements and relations are mapped into this schema. Hence, transitive inference entails a form of analogical reasoning. Once the mapping is made, only the order of ele ments and the relation need be retained. The process of mapping tbe problem into tbe schema imposes a high processing load be cause the premises must be processed jointly.
Class Inclusion
A class inclusion task involves a hierarchy of two subordinate classes included in a superordinate class, e.g., apples and pears in cluded i.n fru jt. Participants are asked to com pare subordinate and superordinate classes, e.g., to judge whether lhere are more apples or more f ruiL The task traditionally has been found lo be difficult for young children, al-though older children and adults also make errors. Numerous attempts have been made lo explajn these errors [see Halford, l 989. for a summary], and there have been a number of reviews of the class inclusion literature [Hal ford. 1982 : Leitch. 1989 Winer, 1980] .
One explanation for children's errors is tbat they misapply the rule that each object is counted only once [Klahr and Wallace, l 976: Trabasso et al., 1978; Wilkinson, 1976] . 1 have discussed problems with this explana tion elsewhere [Halford. l 982] . The most im portant objection is that it fails to capture lhe essence of inclusion logic. For example, we know there are more children than girls. with out knowing bow many of either there are. Understanding the logic of inclusion does not depend on quantifying the classes.
Another class of explanation hold that chil dren interpret the question as requiring sub class comparison, because the exclusive or distributive comparison is more common in language than the inclusive comparison [Shi pley. 1979 : Fuson el aJ .. 1988 . For example. we might ask whether someone has more dogs or more cats, but we are unlikely to ask whether they have more dogs or more ani mals. Provision of a label for U1e superordi nate class [McGarrigle et al., 1978] or use of collective tenns such as 'family', 'pile' or 'bunch' [Markman and Sieben. J 976] bas been found to facilitate class inclusion under some condilions. It has also been suggested that when children are shown a display such as tJuee black horses and one white horse and are asked whether there are more horses or more black horses, they interpret horses lo mean white horses: i.e .. they supply what they assume to be the missing modifier [Grieve and Garton. 1981 ] . resulting in a subclass comparison (black horses versus white horses).
Still another proposal is that young chil dren succeed on class inclusion tasks if they are presented in a suitable format [McGarrigle et al., I 978; Siegel et al., 1978) . However, many of the claimed successes in these studies renect no better than chance performance, and some of tbe tasks used could be performed by means other than class inclusion logic [Hal ford. l 989]. Furthermore. an elegant analysis by Hodkin [ L 987] showed that much of the apparent improvement in pcrfomrnnce of younger children produced by various experi mental manipulations was due to guessing, and that no evidence existed of class inclusion reasoning by children under 5 years of age.
Rabinowitz et al.
[ L 989] present data and a performance model suggesting that diffi culty of class inclusion is due to the processing load it imposes. They attribute the Load to the exe cution of subskills, together with the assembly of the subskills into a solution procedure. The subskills (such as interpretation of the ques tion) may be present quite early, but they impose smaller loads as they become more automatic, leaving more capacity for planning and executing the solution. fn essence J agree with this analysis, but the argument T wiU present focuses on the planning process. which I believe includes the use of analogies with similar sjtuations.
To summarise, some important factors af fe cting children's performance on the class inclusion task have been demonstrated. but even when they are taken into account. the task remains difficult, especially for children under 5 years of age. Recent reviews of class inclusion research by Leitch [ 1989] and Hal ford [1989] are consistent witb Lhe analysis by Hod.kin [ 1987] in suggesLing that tbe concept is an inherently difficult one for young chil dren. Tbe proposals reviewed here explain part of the difficulty that children experience with the task, but a certain amount remains unexplained. I wiU now examine the ability of an analogical theory to explain the remaining difficulties.
Analogical Reasoning and Class Tnc/11sion
The type of representatio11 children use in a class inclusion task is not as well known as that used in transitive jnference. However, an analogy model would predict that class inclu sion is performed by mapping the problem into an analog or schema. To be suitable, the schema must have a structure that corre sponds to the inclusion task, must be avail able to the child, and must have known rela tions between sets.
One suitable schema is the family, because it is isomorphic to inclusion and can be map ped into an inclusion problem, as shown in figure 2A . The family schema is well known to young children. and the small set sizes make it easy to recognize that the family is more than the cbiJdren or the parents. Children might select the family or a similar schema by look ing for a situation that involves large and small classes -a class that is 'a lot' and a class that is ·a litile' -and overlapping member ln order to identify a class as subordinate or superordinate, it is necessary to consider its relations to at least two other classes. We know that fruit is the superordinate because it has at Least two subclasses. and we know apples is a subordinate because it is part of the class of fruit, and that there is at least one other subclass of fruit. Tbus, we can only identify superordinate classes and subclasses and Holyoak and Tbagard [1989] have shown, the mapping can be performed by a mechanism Urnt depends on establishing structural correspondence. The mapping process does not entail knowing that family is a superorcLinate or tJ1at parents and children are subordinates. Notice that in figure 2A the base schema does not include explicit representation of superordi nate or subordinate classes, nor does it in clude relations like 'included in' or 'comple ment of'. The relations in the base schema are those that children would normally know in the family context: parents are 'part or· the family. as are children. Tn this respect. the inclusion schema is quite like the permission schema. Permission can be used as an analog of implication, without explicitly knowing that it is permission or that the two are iso morphic. Successful mappings can be made by processes that seek structural correspon dence without this knowledge [Holyoak and Thagard, 1 989: FaJJ<enhainer et al., 1990 ].
An advantage of analogical reasoning is that it can be based on a representation that is quite concrete and specific. Thus, representa tion of a superordinate class and two of its subclasses does not entail explicit understand ing of the concept of inclusion. All that is required is a representation of a concrete example.
Once having mapped fruit. pears. and ap ples into the family (parents and children), the next step is to retrieve the relation that family is more than parents. Given the small set sizes. this retrieval is well within the quantifi cation abilities of even very young children [Klahr and Wallace, 1976] . The relation is then transferred to the corresponding sets in tbe target (fruit and apples), permitting the inference that fru it is more than apples.
Mapping a class inclusion problem into a suitable schema must be based on consider ation of at least two relations between sets, which imposes a high processing load. Notice that you cannot decide whether fruit should be mapped to family (or parents to children) without considering the relation of family to pears and fruit. lf the sets had been fruit. meat, and food, fruit would have had to be mapped to parents or children. The correct mapping can only be determined by examin ing the whole structure.
It has often been noted that children who cannot perform class inclusion neverU1eJess recogn ize various fe atures of a class inclusion hierarchy [Halford. 1982] . For example, they would probably know that apples and pears are both fru it. Nevertheless, they cannot make a class inclusion inference. l suggest that part of the reason is that they cannot map tbis knowledge into a schema that gives a coherent representation of the sets and relations in volved. It is rather fragmented, content-spe cific knowledge. The inclusion inference re quires a representation of the essential hierar chial structure. lt cannot be made by inspect ing individual sets, or by inspecting any pair of sets. The combined relations between the two subordinate sets and the superordinate set ml1st be represented and processed in de ciding the correct answer to the inclusion question.
Structural Complexity
Common Factors in Tr ansi1ivirr and Clas. ,· I nc/11sion Class inclusion and transitivity are superfi cially very different tasks. However, they have some underlying properties in common. One is that both can be performed by mapping the problem into a famiJiar schema learned from life experience. That is. the underlying pro-cess involved in both entails analogical rea sorting. Another common property is tbat suc cess on both tasks depends on integrating binary relations. Transitivity depends on inte grating relations a> b and b > c to produce a > b > c. Class inclusion depends on inte grating relations 'included in' and 'comple ment of' to produce an inclusion hierarchy. l suggest that this common underlying factor is the cause of the difficulty of both tasks for botb children and adults. The problem in gen eral terms is that tasks that entail a mapping based on two relations processed jointly im pose high processing loads.
The difficulty of maldng this mapping ex plains a common source of error in both transitivity and class inclusion problems. In the former, a common error is to consider only one relation at a time. This leads to ordering errors. For example, if a> b, b > c, and a > c, it is sometimes concluded that the correct order is acb. and the smallest item is b. The order acb is consistent with the last prem ise. but not the previous one [Halford, 1 984] . A major source of error in class inclusion is the problem of identifying the superordinate class and distinguishing it from subordinate classes. This problem could arise because of the difficulty of mapping the superordinate into the appropriate component of the inclu sion schema. as discussed earlier. The fact that doing so is difficult should tend to cause participants to default to a simpler mapping to reduce the processing load. One way to simplify the mapping is to use a subset com parison scbema, i.e., one consistfog of only two sets. one larger than the other, as shown in figure 28. Tbe child is asked whether there arc more fr uit or pears. lf pears appears as a large set, it is mapped into the larger set of the schema, so the other set, fruit. is mapped into the only remaining component of the schema. the smaller set. Thus. the tendency to inter pret class inclusion as subclass comparison could be partly a default to an analog that entails a simpler mapping. It therefore may be related Lo the tendency to interpret implica tion as double implication, which. as noted earlier, possibly results from using an inap propriate analog. If I am right in believing that class inclu sion is difficult because of its structural com plexity. a superficially dissimilar task that en tails the same structure should be similarly difficult. This prediction was tested [HaJford and Leitch. 1989 : Leitch, 1989 , using the task shown in figure 3. Children were taught to discriminate between inclusive sets, such as a red square and a red triangle (square and triangle a.re included in red). disjoint sets. such as a red square and a green triangle. and identical sets. such as two red squares. Notice that the inclusive set can be mapped into U1e inclusion hierarchy and is structurally similar to it.
To obviate lhe linguistic difficulties with the traditional class inclusion test, cbiJdren were shown two dolls and were told tbat the dolls liked to have things that were 'a bit the same and a bit di fferent'. Notice that only inclusion sets meet tbis criterion. Five-and 6-year-olds learned to recognize inclusion sets, whereas 3-and 4-year-olds did not. A fi.lrther experiment employing tbe easy-to-hard para digm [Hunt and Landsman, 1982] showed that children's performance on this task was a function of available processing capacity.
Thus, there is evidence that a task that is structurally isomorphic to class inclusion, but is extremely different from it in other re spects, causes difficulties for children of tbe same age range as those who have difficulties with class inclusion. Ft1rthennore, there is hard evidence that the isomorphic task imposes a high processing load.
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The evidence that an isomorph of the class My purpose now is to generalize tJ1is argu ment. To do so, I will consider a number of possible bases for structure mappings in anal ogies, which are defined by the complexity of the structures they entail. Doing so will lead us to a complexity metric.
Levels of Mapping
Bases for structure mappings have been outlined elsewhere [Halford, 1987: Halford and Wilson. 1980] At the level of detailed process models, analogies and representations based on learn.
ing are very dilTerent. The ACME model [Ho lyoak and Thagard, l 989], SME [Falkenhainer et at.. 1989] , COPYCAT [Mitchell and Hofstadter. 1990 ). and STAR [Halford et al., in press] give accounts of a process that is very different from the learning mechanisms de fined by Holland ct al. [ 1986] or Holyoak et al.
[ related to metaphors because metaphors de pend on attribute similarity . In terms of structure mapping theory. element mappings are a degenerate or primitive case, because they do not entail structural corre spondence as such. Relarional .Mappings. Relational mappings entail the mapping of two elements with a relation between them. They therefore entail binary relations or univariate functions, both of which have two arguments [Halford and Wilson. 1980 ). The mapping is validated by the similarity of the relation in base and target and is independent of element similarity or convention. The mapping of human:baby to horse: foal in the analogy mentioned earlier is a relational mapping: it is validated by simi larity of the parent-offspring relation in base and target. Mappings at this level impose a higher processing load than element map pings because they entail taking account of two elements and the relation between them. However. they are more flexible than element mappings, because they are independent of element similarity. For example, the hu man:baby-horse:foal analogy can be con structed even though there need be no resem blance between a human and a horse.
Subclass comparison ill class inclusion tasks i.s also a relational mappjng. As men tioned earlier, this error might reflect a de fa ult strategy of relying on a simpler schema. comprising just two classes, one of which is larger than the other. The type of mapping entailed is shown in figure 2B . Suppose that a child is presented with J 2 pears and 3 apples and is asked whether there are more pears or more fru it. If fruit is interpreted to mean apples. the question becomes whether there are more pears or more apples, which entails mapping these two sets into a simple set com parison schema. This is a much simpler map ping than mapping into an inclusion hierar chy, as in figure 2A .
I I al ford
Sys tem Mappings. A system mappiog en tails mapping three elements and two rela tions in the base into corresponding elements and relations in the target. They therefore entail ternary relations (relations with three arguments). System mappings therefore in clude transitivity ( fig. I ) and class inclusion (tig. 2A). However, ternary relations are equivalent to binary operations and bivariate functions, which have three arguments [Hal ford and Wilson, 1980] . We can illustrate the properties of system mappings by reference to transitive inference ( fig. 1) . In this mapping. each of John, Peter. and Torn is mapped to one and only one element in the base (each is assigned to a unique position in the schema), and the relation 'fairer than' in the premises consistently corresponds to the relation 'above' in the schema. Tbe one-to-one map ping of elements and relations in the base to elements and relations in tbe target consti tu1es the uniqueness propeny of system map pings. Furtbennore, when a relation is map ped. the elements correspond; for example, when 'John is fairer than Peter' is mapped into 'top above middle', not only does ·fairer than' correspond to ·above', but John is map ped to top and Peter to middle. More general ly, when a relation (predicate) in the base is mapped into a relation (predicate) in the tar get, the arguments of the base relation (predj cale) are mapped to the arguments of the tar get relation (predicate). This characteristic constitutes the correspondence property of sys tem mappings. lo its more general fom1. if a predicate P in structure l is mapped to a pre dicate P' in structure 2. the arguments of P will be mapped to the arguments of P' and vice versa.
The tiniqucncss and COITeSpondence prop erties subsume the consistency requiremem proposed by Halford and Wilson [ 1980] . They can be achieved by the parallel con straint satisfaction model (ACME) of Ho-lyoak and Thagard [1989] , as cao be illus trated with reference to figure l. The unique ness property is acbieved in ACME by inhibi tory connections to rival mappings, e.g., the mapping of John into top bas an inhibitory connection to a mapping of John into middle or bottom. Such inhibitory connections tend to ensure that each element is mapped to one and only one element in the other structure. The correspondence property is achieved in ACME by excitatory connections between mappings that should logically occur together, e.g .. the mapping of 'above' into 'fairer than' has an excitatory connection to the mapping of top into John and middle into Peter. Thus, mappings such as those in figures I and 2 can be achieved by specifiable mechanisms purely on the basis or structural correspondence. No additional knowledge need be imported.
System mappings are more flex..i ble than element or relational mappings because they are validated by the uniqueness and corre spondence properties and are independent of both element and relational similarity. For example, in figure I, any resemblance be tween base a. od target elements and relations is irrelevant to the validity of the mapping. (It does not depend on similarity between 'John' and 'top' or between 'fairer than' and 'above'.) This flexibility makes possible mappings that are more 'abstract' and less content-depen dent than are lower-level mappings. However, this flexibility is purcbased at the price of a higher processing load. created by the need to process two relations simultaneously.
Multiple System Mappings. Multiple sys tem mappings are similar to system mappings except that they depend on mapping two binary operations, two ternary relations, or three binary relations in a single decision. ln other words, they can process structures that can be expressed as sets of ordered 4-tuples, or quaternary relations [Halford and Wilson, 1980) . This capability permits an expression such as (7 o 3) * 4 = I lo be interpreted by mapping it into the corresponding arillunetic statement (7-3)/4= 1. This task. entails map ping a structure equivalent to two binary operations. It imposes a higher processing load than interpreting the expression (7 o 3)/4 =I. because this can be transformed to (7 o 3) = 4, so only one operation need be inter preted, wb.ich makes it a system mapping [Halford et al., 1984) . Verification of the alge braic distributive law a(b + c) = (ab) + (ac) by mapping it into an arithmetic example such as 3(2 +4)=(3 X 2) +(3 X 4) is al)otherexample of this level of mapping [Halford and Boul ton-Lewis, in press] .
At this level of structure, tbe equivalent of three binary relations and four elements must be mapped. Like system mappings, multiple system mappings are validated by the unique ness and correspondence properties, and they are independent of element and relational similaiity. They impose higher processing loads than system mappings because of the extra information (equivalent to a quaternary relation) that must be processed jointly 1 n order to construct valid mappings.
Pr ocessing Loads
The quantification of the loads associated with the different levels of mapping depends oo the dirn.ensionality of the structures being mapped. Dimensionality is defined as the minimum number of independent elements required to define the structure. It corre sponds to the number of arguments of the n ary relations discussed earlier. Element map pings entail unary relations and are one dimensional; relational mappings entail bi nary relations and are two-dimensional; sys tem mappings entail ternary relations and are three-dimensional; and multiple system map pings entail quaternary relations and are four dimensional.
This metric for conceptual complexily is similar to the metric used by Kotovsky and Simon [J 973], Leeuwen berg [ 1969] . Restle [1970] , and Simon [ 1972] to quantify the complexity of patterns. Both depend on the number of independent signals or items of information required to define the concept or pattern. It is preferable to the metric used by Egan and Greeno (1974] and Case [1985] , based on the number of levels of embedding of a subroutine or goal hierarchy. because sub routine hierarchies are not intrinsically con strained. and diff erent hierarchies, with con sequent different complexity values, can be obtained by rewriting the program used to model the performance. Also. contemporary parallel distributed processing (PDP) models of cognition cast doubt on serial processing and subroutines as ways of viewing the opera tion of the brain [Rumelbarl et al., 1986] .
It has beeo confirmed empirically that the higher-level mappings impose greater pro cessing loads on human performers [Halford et al., J 984. 1986: Halford and Leitch. 1989: Maybery et al.. J 986] . In all of these studies. the level of mapping was varied and other fac tors held constant; secondary task indicators were used to compare the resulting processing loads. The methodologies avoided the specific interference and other alternaLivc interpreta tions of the dual task data [see especially May bery et al., 1986] , and in two of the studies [Halford et al., 1984; Halford and Leitch, 1989) , we used the 'easy-to-hard' paradigm [Hunt and Lansman, 1982] , which is not sub ject to these ambiguities.
Processing load applies to an inference based 011 analogical reasoning. Reasolling by analogy may occur when a solution cannot be retrieved from memory and no other algo rithm or strategy for generating the solution exists. However. analogical reasoning is fre quently important in the acquisitjon of such strategies. We have developed a self-modi-fying production system model of the acquisi tion of transitive inference [Halford et al.. I 991 ] , which uses the type of analogicaJ rea soning shown in figure I to determine tbe cor rect solution. then constructs strategies using means-end analysis. Tbe processing load ap plies in the early pbase when analogical rea soning is required. but not after a strategy is developed. Thus, structural complex.ity of concepts does not affect processing load once participants are well practised at dealing with the concepts. but it does affect their ability to develop and transfer appropriate strategics. The use of a production system model is not conceptllally incompatible with the STAR model, which is based on PDP architecture, for modeling analogical reasoning, because it is possible in principle to handle production systems withjn PDP architectures [Touretzky and Hinton. 1988] .
The processing loads associated with ana logical reasoning do not apply to tasks that do not require one mental representation to be mapped into another. such as the transitivity problems of Pears and Bryant [1989] dis cussed earlier. Neither would they apply to tasks ·involving inferences based on category membership, such as those used by Gelman [J 988] . The inference that an animal can see in the dark because it is a cat can be retrieved directly from a representation of the cat cate gory. and analogical mapping is not required.
To summarise, the levels categorize struc ture mapping processes into equivalence classes of equal complexity. defined in terms of the dimensionality of the structures they entail. This framework general izes the argu ment, presented earlier, that transitivity and class inclusjon have a common degree of structural complexity, despite their superfi cial dissimilarity.
Relations to Other Approaches
A current major issue in the field is whether cognitive development can be ex.
plained by the acquisition or domain knowl edge. as contended by Chi and Ceci [ 1987] and Carey [ 1985] , or whether it is also neces sary to postulate changes in the underlying Structure has been one of the most impor tant concepts in cogn itive development. Not only does it have a centra.1 role in Piaget's the ory [Halford, I 982, 1989] . but it figures prom inently in a number of neo-Piagetian theories [Case, 1985 [Case, . 1992 [Halford, 1978 [Halford, . 1982 [Halford, . 1989 Sheppard. 1978] . Part of the problem is to identify these structures with anything that is known about cogn itive architectures. These difficulties are part of the reason for the decline in popularity of Piaget's theory, although his empirical work has held up better than is often supposed [Halford. 1989]. When formulated in this way, the concept of structure is compatible with the broad field of cogniHve psychology. Furthermore. the new conception of structure is devoid of tbe mysteries and uncertainties of some of Pia get's earlier conceptions. Therefore, the his tory of the concept of structure parallels that of other Piagetian concepts such as schema, which has reappeared in modern cognitive psychology. The concept may even be seen as compatible with PDP conceptions of cogni tion [Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986] . The explanatory power of contemporary concepts is greater because of increased knowledge of reasoning mechanisms. processing loads, and capacity. This power can be used to build on Piaget's legacy, but cognitive development theory must be formulated in a way that aUows the achievements of general cognitive psychology to be applied to it. That has been one of the aims of this article.
The four levels of structu(e mapping de fined earlier have a broad correspondence to some of Piaget's [ 1950] stages. Element, rela tional, system, and multiple system mappings correspond in a general way to Piaget's pre operational. intuitive. concrete operational. and formal operational stages. Element map pings can handle images and concept labels, without recognition of the structure of the concepts. RelationaJ mappings can handle single binary relations, but without integra tion of relations into a single conception. They are consistent with Piaget's claim that preoperational children can process only one relation at a time. However, they tie a number of concepts, by no means all of which are Pia getian, into a single equivalence class and pro vide a process model to operate on tJ1al class of concepts.
RelationaJ mappings. entailing two.dimen sional concepts, can aJso handle functions [Piaget et al., 1968] . because fu nctions are defined as sets of ordered pairs [Halford and 212 tlalford Wilson, 1980] . System mappings can handle concrete operations, because they integrate relations, and can handle binary operations. Multiple system mappings can handle formal operations, because they entail compositions of binary operations. In contrast to Piaget's stage structures, however, the levels of m(lp ping defined here can be integrated with well established cognitive processes, such as ana logical reasoning and pragmatic reasoning schemas. Thus, they capture the essence of some of Piaget's most important insights and make them relevant to contemporary cogni tive psychology. As the ST AR model [Halford et al.. iu press] shows, they even tie Piaget's conception of stages of thought to the dimen sionality of PDP representations. This con nection reinforces El man's [ 1991] suggestion that PDP models can clarify some significant developmental mysteries. Among other approaches to quantifying the processing loads imposed by cognitive de velopmental tasks, the most notable are those by Case [ 1985] and Pascual-Leone [ 1970) . The similarities and differences between these approaches and tbe metric proposed by Halford and Wilson [t 980 ] are discussed in detail elsewhei:e [Halford, in press] . The most relevant difference in the present context is that the current approach is the only one that quantifies the complexity of the major classes of structures. Pascual-Leone [ J 970] assesses processing loads but does not define struc tures. Case [ 1985] defines four major levels of structure -the sensorimotor, relational, di· mensional, and vectorial. Loads are assessed as OPx + s, where OPx is an unspecified parameter corresponding to one of the levels described earlier. and s refers to the load imposed by the substages. There is no quantif ication of the load imposed by the major lev els. Case [ 1992) also defines central concep tual structures. which appear to be similar to pragmatic reasoning schemas. Case shows that they apply to both quantitative and social thought. However, a complete theory requires that the processes of acquiring and using these structures be spelled out, and that has been one aim of the present article.
Applications
Although this article is not primarily con cerned with applications, it is worth noting that a theory of cogn itive development based on analogical mapping has considerable ap plied relevance both to accelerating develop ment [Halford, in press] and to mathematics education [Halford and Boulton-Lewis. in press]. Reasoning can be facilitated much more effi ciently if natural reason ing processes are understood. Facilitating use of appro priate pragmatic reasoning schemas has been shown to promote development of reason ing skills in adults [Nisbett et al., 1987] . In the present context, we can promote transitive inference more effi ciently if we understand the mechanisms underlying performance and the difficulties the task poses. For example. as l have pointed out elsewhere [Halford. 1984) .
there exists a strategy for constructing an ordered representation of premise elements in transitive inference that entails considering only one relation at a time, thereby reducing processing loads. This strategy can be used under specified conditions. If we wished lo test the prediction that children have diffi culty processing two relations in parallel, these conditions would be avoided, because they allow the child to succeed without con sidering two relations at a time. However, if we want lo facilitate children's perfomrnncc on transitive inference problems, these condi tions can be utilised. The processes entailed in transitive inference are now sufficiently well understood that the number of relations, or amount of structure, that children arc required lo process in one decision can be ma nipulated. In sum, whether we want to test a theory or accelerate development, detailed and precise process analyses are beneficial.
Conclusion
My argument in this article has been that much of human reasoning is basically analogi cal. Such reasoning entails mapping a prob lem representation into a suucturally similar base schema. This process imposes a load that depends on the level of mapping required, which is defined in terms of the dimensional ity of the structures. Some tasks that have been found to cause difficulty for children and adults entail mapping structures of rela tively high dimensionality. The theoretical pred iction that these structures impose higb loads bas been confirmed empirically.
The formulation presented here allows some impo1tant concepts in earlier cogn itive developmental theories to be reinterpreted.
The concept of structure is still seen as funda mentally important, because structural simi larity is the main factor that governs analogi cal mapping. which I argue to be the core pro cess in much of human inference. However, the structures are induced from ordinary lif e experience. rather than being mysterious properties of the mind. I do not postuLate stages, but concepts can be grouped into equivalence classes (levels) of equal dimen sionality, which in turn predict the processing loads they impose. These levels define proper ties of tasks, whereas stages purport to define properties of children. It is not suggested that every concept in a pa1ticular class is attained at the same point in development. There is potentially an infinite number of concepts at each level. many of which may never be acquired, because they are not instantiated in the child's experience. However, insofar as concepts must be represented as a whole, each level is associated with a processing load that will affect children's ability to utilise the con cept.
The main aim of this article has been Lo take a step toward identifying a reasoning mechanism that is compatible with both con stnictivist and information-processi ng theo ries of cogn ition. I have reformulated some core questions, such as whether the underly ing processes of cognition change with age.
Specifically, I suggest that there are develop mental changes in capacity to use domain geoeral methods such as analogy, which are entailed in acquiring expertjse. Finally, be cause analogical reasoning entails mapping one structure into ano1her, the present formulation once again highlights the importance of structure in cogn itive development, but it also provides an account of the origin of the struc tures employed. By showing how the mapping process is affected by structural compJexity, it offers an explanation for some long-standing observa6ons concerning the difficulties young children have with some key concepts.
